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NOTES AND COMMENTS 7.U1
The Legislature has made the results of these tests and the findings
of the experts who conduct them on the question of paternity receivable
in evidence,3 not only in bastardy proceedings,4 but also "Whenever it
shall be relevant in a civil or criminal action or proceeding to determine
the identity of any person. . . ."' In addition, this act provides that the
court shall, on motion, order blood-grouping tests to be made by com-
petent persons, and makes refusal of any party to submit to the test
admissable in evidence. New York and Wisconsin have similar statutes.'
In the recent case of State ex rel. Slovak v. Ilolod, Jr.,' the trial
court refused a request to charge that the results of tests which excluded
the defendant as the possible father were conclusive of the question. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth District, in affirming this action, recog-
nized the value of the evidence, but evinced a reluctance to give it con-
clusive weight. The court explained its attitude with the fact that many
"(natural laws" once thought to be infallible have been found to be
inaccurate. Further, "It transgresses the usual rule that positive evidence
is ordinarily of greater weight than negative proof." While this opinion
seems less favorable to the use of blood-grouping tests than does that of
State v. IVright,' it will be seen that a different question was involved.
In the latter case, the evidence was considered of sufficient weight to
justify the granting of a new trial. In this case, the court was asked to
make it conclusive. It is not unlikely that, had the problem been similar
to that of the Wright case, the same conclusion would have been reached.
J.R. E.
INSURANCE
INSURANCE - INSURANCE OF LIMITED INTERESTS
EFFECT OF VALUED POLICY LAW
The plaintiff was the owner of an undivided one-third interest in
certain property. After an examination of the property, the defendant
insurance company issued a policy which apparently covered its full
value. While this policy was in effect the property was totally destroyed
by fire. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover the entire amount of the policy.'
'Act of May 25, 1939, uiS Ohio Laws H. 2x3.
'Ohio General Code, sec. 12122-1.
'Id., Sec. 12122-2.
'New York Civil Practice Act, sec. 3o6-a, New York Laws, 1935, Ch. 196; Wiscon-in Laws i935, Ch. 351.
'63 Ohio App. I6 (1939).
8Supra, note i.
'Summers v. Stark County Patrons Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ohio App. 73 (x939).
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The plaintiff, as owner of one-third the fee, clearly had an insurable
interest.2 But he is not the sole and unconditional owner of the property
as required under the standard fire insurance policy. However, since the
agent of the company was informed as to the nature of the plaintiff's
interest when the contract was made, the great weight of authority
would say that the company is estopped from later denying that plaintiff
was the sole and unconditional owner.3 Furthermore, the provision of
the Ohio General Code in section 9583 that only an increase in the risk
by the insured, or fraud on the part of the insured, will defeat the policy,
would aid the plaintiff in this respect. Therefore, the policy would not
be avoided on this ground.
The insured may insure his own interest, or by acting as the agent
for the others holding interests therein, he might insure the whole prop-
erty.' The facts as set out by the court, however, would seem to indicate
that such was not done, and that the plaintiff was insuring the whole
property for his own benefit. The question now is, whether, if the plain-
tiff pays the premium for insurance covering the whole property, he may
recover the full value thereof, in the event a total loss occurs.
The purpose of the insurance contract is indemnity and not profit.'
When the insured has recovered to the extent of his loss, he is entitled
to no more. It should be noted, however, in cases where the insurer has
taken a large premium, and there is a question as to what will constitute
full indemnity, the benefit of the doubt is usually resolved in favor of the
insured. Thus, a life tenant has been allowed to recover the full value of
the property.' In such a situation the insured is usually a widow who
has suffered the loss of a home. Adequate replacement cannot be made
by giving her a sum of money based on her life expectancy, as some
courts have done.7 For the same reason, one having a homestead inter-
est has been allowed a full recovery.'
2 In VANCE, INSURANCE (2d Ed. 1930) sec. So, an insurable interest is defined as fol-
lows: "A person has an insurable interest in property when he sustains such relations with
respect to it that he has a reasonable expectation, resting upon the basis of legal right, of
benefit to be derived from its continued existence, or of loss or liability from its destruc-
tion."
3 Forward v. Continental Ins. Co., 14z N.Y. 382 (1894); Welch v. Fire Ass'n of
Phila., 120 Wis. 456, 98 N.W. 227 (i9o4-); Trustees of St. Clara Female Academy v.
N. W. Nat. Ins. Co., 73 N.W. 767 (Wis. 1898); Clawson v. Citizen's Mat. Fire Ins. Co.,
izi Mich. 59!, So N.W. 573 (899).
' Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N.J.L. 543, 46 Am. Rep. 79Z (1883).
'Harrington v. Agr. Ins. Co., 179 Minn. 5io, zz9 N.V. 792, 68 A.L.R. 1343
(i93o); Larner v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., Iz7 Misc. z, 215 N.Y.S. 151 (x9z6);
In re Clover Ridge Planting and Mfg. Co., 178 La. 302, 151 So. 2sZ (1934.).
'Convis v. Citizen's Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 1Z7 Mich. 616, 86 N.W. 994 (sgoz);
Andes Ins. Co. v. Fish, 71 Ill. 6zo (1874).
'Beckman v. Fulton Co. Farmer's Mut. F. Ins. Ass'n, 66 App. Div. 72, 73 N.Y.S.
11o (19o); Doyle v. Amer. F. Ins. Co., x8i Mass. 139, 63 N.E. 394 (1902).
'Merritt v. Farmers' Ins. Co-, 42 Iowa 1s (1875).
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In the principal case the value of the plaintiff's interest is more
exactly ascertainable. The payment of the value of his one-third interest
as measured by the total value of the property would fully indemnify
him, and in absence of statute, that is all he would recover.'
Ohio, like many other states,'" has a valued policy statute. This
statute, Ohio G.C. sec. 9583, provides in part: "A person, company,
or association insuring any building or structure against loss or damage
by fire or lightning, by renewal of a policy, shall cause such building or
structure to be examined by his or its agent, and a full description thereof
be made, and its insurable value fixed by him . . . in case of total loss,
the whole amount mentioned in the policy or renewal upon which the
insurer received a premium, shall be paid." Thus, for example, under
this statute an insurance company insuring property for $9000 could not
later go behind the policy to show that its actual worth was only $6ooo."
The usual statement as to the purpose of this statute is that it is in-
tended to reduce losses by exacting of insurance companies reasonable
diligene and care in avoiding improper risks and over-insurance. 2 Most
experts believe, however, that the opposite result is reached."
Does this statute apply to the owner of a one-third interest in prop-
erty? The court in the principal case held that it did. It must be ad-
mitted that a majority of cases that have been decided under the valued
policy laws are in accord,' 4 and it is easy enough to reach this decision
by a literal construction of the statute. Then would the court apply it to
the owner of a one one-hundredth interest, to the situation where the
insured is the owner of a single share in a large corporation? Can a line
be drawn, and if so, where? It would seem more reasonable to construe
the statute as setting the conclusive valuation of the property which could
not later be challenged by the insurer, but not operating as a foreclosure
of the issue of the value of the insured's interest. Under the holding of
the principal case if all three owning an interest insured the property as
did the plaintiff, a recovery of $6ooo would be allowed on property
'Amer. Ins. Co. V. Porter, 2S Ala. App. 250, x44. So. 129 (1932); Ins. Co. v. Ham-
mcr, z Ohio St. 452 (853); Burrows v. Farmers' Alliance Ins. Co., III Kan. 358, 207
Pac.433 (1922).
"'Since the adoption of the first valued policy law by Wisconsin in 1874 twenty-three
other states have enacted statutes of the same general tenor.
'Schild v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 6 Ohio N.P. 134, 8 Ohio Op. 45 (iS99) where the
court would not permit insurer's claim that property was worth $989 when it had been
valued in the policy at $x,ooo.
"Ins. Co. -. Leslie, 47 Ohio St. 409, 24 N.E. 1072 (1890).
HARDY, RIsK AND RISK-BEARuNG (rev. ed. 1931); 302i PJFAL AND LOTMAN, INSUR-
ANCE PRINCIPLES AND PAcrIcEs (rev. ed. 1929) 324-325; Huebner, FIRE INSURANCE in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Vol. VI, 1931) 256-257.
"Hilliard v. Caledonia Ins. Co., 7 Ohio N.P. 561, 5 Ohio Dec. 576 (1895); Hub-
hard v. Austin, 6 Ohio N.P. 249, 8 Ohio Dec. zii (1899); Ins. Co. v. Leslie, 47
Ohio St. 409, 24 N.E. 107z (I89o).
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worth only $2000. Under the suggested construction, the property
would be held to be worth $2000, but the insured, who insured only his
interest therein, would recover $667, the actual value of his interest.
This would seem to be more consistent with both the purpose of the
statute, and the principle of indemnity upon which insurance is based.
P.E.S.
INSURANCE - SUBROGATION OF INSURANCE CO. TO
CLAIMS AGAINST THE TORT FEASOR
In many kinds of insurance a company which has paid a claim un-
der the policy may maintain an action against the tort feasor who was
responsible for the loss. While the policy often expressly provides for
subrogation, the right exists without a contract and is said to be based
upon dictates of equity and conscience.' Among those policies which
provide for subrogation of the insurer to the rights of the insured, in-
cluding those in the form of the New York standard, the insured's rights
must be measured solely on the terms of such provisions.2 Subrogation
is a basic doctrine of suretyship and its extension to insurance was founded
on the principle that insurance is a contract of indemnity.' Conse-
quently the rationale of the courts in determining whether such a right
exists is to tag a particular type of insurance indemnity, or non-indem-
nity protection. Hence it has been applied without question to fire insur-
ance.4 Since the right of subrogation grows out of the principle of
indemnity, it follows that the insurer is not entitled to subrogation until
he has paid the insured's claim or until the insured has been fully indem-
nified for his loss. The recent Ohio case of McConnell v. Conway'
concluded, "an insurer, having paid the amount of a policy issued on a
building destroyed by an incendiary, will not be subrogated to the claim
of the insured against the wrongdoer, unless and until the insured has
been indemnified fully for his loss." This is illustrative of the court's
reliance upon the relation of subrogation to indemnity and its use as a
vehicle for problems arising under this doctrine.6 Although there have
'Am. Central Ins. Co. v. Weller, xo6 Or. 494, zz Pac. 803 (1923).
'Home Ins. Co. v. Hartshorn, iz8 Miss. 28z2, 90 So. 1 (192z)5 Williams & Miller
Gin Co. v. Baker Cotton Oil Co., so8 Okla. IZ7, z35 Pac. 18S (i925).
'Newcomb v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., zz Ohio St. 382, zo Am. Rep. 736 (1872); Phenix
Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 134. Ind. 2x5, 20 L.R.A. 405 , 33 N.E. 970 (1892);
PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW, (935) P. 119.
'Baltimore Am. Underwriters of Baltimore Am. Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Beckley, 195 Atl.
550 (Md., 1937); Norwich Union F. Ins. Soc. v. Stang, IS Ohio C.C. 464, 9 Ohio Cir.
Dec. 576 (897); Sun Oil Co. v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., I. Ohio Cir. Ct. 355, 8 Ohio
Cir. Dec. 145 (5898).
62 Ohio App. 335, 23 N.E. (zd) 970, I5 Ohio Op. 508 (5939).
'Svea Assur. Co. v. Packham, 9z Md. 464, 48 Atl. 35, 52 L.R.A. 9S (i9o).
